Deliberating without knowing: the epistemic limits of democracy

No citizenry can itself assess the evidence on monetary policy, nuclear safety and epidemiology. The question is not how to avoid delegation, but how to make it accountable.

The starting point of this work is a simple observation: in Latin America, formal rules tend to be well written and poorly sustained. The distance between norm and practice is not explained by a lack of design, but by the absence of the administrative bodies and oversight procedures that would make the norm enforceable.

The argument

The analysis shows that institutional changes that endure share two features: they were implemented by bodies with stable staff, and they established from the outset who audits, with what information and within what deadline.

Where those two elements were missing, the reform survived in the legal text but was hollowed out in administrative practice, with a sustained decline in budget execution and in the production of public information.

Why it matters

The practical consequence is that debating institutional design without simultaneously debating who will implement it produces reforms that are announced twice and applied never.

“A rule with nobody to administer it is not a rule: it is an intention published in the official gazette.”

Methodology

The work combines normative analysis, reconstruction of administrative files and interviews with career officials. Primary sources and coding criteria are set out in the methodological annex.

This text is part of the institute's standing editorial line. Data and replication code, where applicable, are published in the Data section.